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Courting Controversy
CHARLES J. TABB-
INTRODUCTION
Lynn LoPucki has written a really good book. Courting
Failure' is about an extremely important problem in
bankruptcy reorganization practice-forum shopping by
large debtor firms seeking a favorable court. On a broader
level, his book raises fundamental questions about the
structure and nature of bankruptcy reorganization practice
and supervision. Professor LoPucki presents a large amount
of interesting and significant data in Courting Failure. He
puts forward some excellent ideas and suggestions-I might
not agree with all of them, but they are plausible ideas.
This book is a work of serious scholarship. Not only that, it
is actually fun and easy to read. The book builds on his
substantial prior empirical work on bankruptcy venue and
forum shopping issues.2 Many experts in the field-
t Alice Curtis Campbell Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
This Article would not have been possible without the extraordinary research
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1. LYNN M. LoPucKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRuPTcY COURTS (2005).
2. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and
Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki,
Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter
11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D.
Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York:
Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001); Lynn
M. LoPucki, Can the Market Evaluate Legal Regimes? A Response to Professors
Rasmussen, Thomas, and Skeel, 54 VAND. L. REV. 331 (2001); Lynn M. LoPucki
& Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002); Lynn M. LoPucki &
Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases, 1 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 111 (2004).
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certainly a significant percentage of bankruptcy
academicians, with apologies to Skeel 3 and Rasmussen, 4
and many bankruptcy practitioners-agree with his basic
premise that the bankruptcy venue statute should be
revised (even though we now know it is likely a vain hope 5)
to eliminate the possibility of forum shopping into Delaware
solely because a debtor is incorporated there. Indeed, the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, chaired by
Elizabeth Warren, recommended precisely such a venue
amendment. 6 All that is on LoPucki's side-yet no one
3. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some
Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1 (1998); David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and
Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243
(2000); David A. Skeel, Jr., What's So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV.
309 (2001); Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Why Do Distressed
Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in
Bankruptcy (U. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 03-
29, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.ctm?abstract_ id=463001.
4. See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters:
Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357
(2000); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A
Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54
VAND. L. REV. 283 (2001).
Other academics who have weighed in on the recent debate include Barry E.
Adler & Henry N. Butler, On the "Delawarization of Bankruptcy" Debate, 52
EMORY L.J. 1309 (2002); Marcus Cole, 'Delaware is Not a State" Are We
Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845
(2002). Prominent reorganization lawyer Harvey R. Miller has also contributed
to the debate. See Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the
Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987 (2002).
Before this all became a cause cgljbre, Elizabeth Gibson wrote Home Court,
Outpost Court: Reconciling Bankruptcy Case Control With Venue Flexibility in
Proceedings, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 37 (1988).
5. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter "BAPCPA"], signed into law by President Bush on April 20, 2005,
omitted any amendments to the bankruptcy venue statute, even though the bill
is quite comprehensive (several hundred pages long) and the venue issue was
well-known. There is little dispute that Senator Biden of Delaware killed any
venue amendment. Sen. Cornyn had introduced venue reform legislation as
part of BAPCPA, but at Sen. Biden's bidding it was excised. In February 2005,
Sen. Cornyn introduced a stand-alone venue reform bill, the Fairness in
Bankruptcy Litigation Act, S. 314, 109th Cong. (2005). That bill is languishing
in committee.
6. NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRuPTcY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARs, FINAL
REPORT 719 (1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/
17bjuris.pdf ("28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) should be amended to prohibit corporate
COURTING CONTROVERSY
cares. The objective merits or demerits of the book are
almost never discussed. Instead, when people talk about the
book, they talk about the controversy LoPucki has
provoked. A wise colleague of mine suggests, as a useful
guide to living, "not to poke people in the eye (unless they
really need it)." Professor LoPucki has indisputably done
some serious eye-poking with his book, Courting Failure. I
want to look at the eye-poking phenomenon. Then I want to
add a few ruminations of my own about the court
competition problem. Maybe I will even poke a few eyes
myself in the process.
I. EVIDENCE THAT EYES HAVE BEEN POKED
The first nugget of evidence that Professor LoPucki has
triggered a major controversy is the very fact that we are
having this symposium about his book. That fact alone is
not enough, of course; professors do sometimes schedule
academic conferences and symposia to discuss books even
when people have not called the author "a dangerous man."
Alas, the author, Lynn LoPucki, the Security Pacific
Bank Professor of Law at UCLA Law School, has been
called just that. Perhaps his most vocal critic has been
Thomas Salerno, a bankruptcy reorganization lawyer, who
has said, among other things:
Lynn LoPucki is a dangerous man. Without the benefit or filter of
experience, he makes rash and irresponsible conclusions about
sitting and retired bankruptcy judges, based on faulty data and
speculation disguised as academic research .... [H]e crosses the
line from good faith to unfounded and unnecessary character
assassination. 7
Want more? How about:
"LoPucki is not a very smart man."8
debtors from filing for relief in a district based solely on the debtor's
incorporation in the state where that district is located.").
7. Critics Punch Holes in Foundation of Court Corruption Theories, BCD
NEWS & COMMENT, Mar. 22, 2005, at 1 (quoting statement by Thomas J.
Salerno).
8. American Bankruptcy Institute's 7th Annual New York City Bankruptcy
Conference-Venue Debate (May 9, 2005), http://www.abiworld.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/NewsRoom/ResearchCenter/LoPuckiVenueDebate atNe
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"These allegations are baseless and offensive to both the
bench and the bar." LoPucki's accusations "were obviously
preconceived conclusions and the data manipulated to reach
the conclusion."9
"He is just trying to sell books."10
These quotes are all from leading members of the
bankruptcy reorganization bar, one of the groups LoPucki
finds fault with in his book, so their retort is to some extent
predictable. But even a more impartial reviewer of the book
observed:
"LoPucki is a natural muckraker; he seems unwilling to
use measured rhetoric when there is a more incendiary
alternative. This goes beyond matters of style; Courting
Failure suffers from a lack of balance."1 1
A sitting bankruptcy judge, and thus a member of
another LoPucki target group, said:
"The bottom line is that this book is an inflammatory
attack on the judges in New York and Delaware. '12
A bankruptcy professor found LoPucki's charges
difficult to believe:
"These are a group of conscientious bankruptcy judges.
They don't sell their rulings.' 13
w_YorkCityConference/LoPuckiVenueDebate atNewYorkCityConferen
ce.htm (statement by Robert J. Rosenberg) (emphasis added).
9. Stephen Taub & Dave Cook, Court Competition: Bad for Bankruptcies?,
CFO.com, May 4, 2005, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm1334137?f=advancesearch
(quoting statement by James Sprayregen) (emphasis added); Pamela A.
MacLean, Bankruptcy Judges Hawking Their Wares? Law Professor Suggests
Venues Are Competing for Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 426 N.J. L.J., May 9, 2005
(also quoting statement by James Sprayregen).
10. MacLean, supra note 9 (quoting statement by Laura Davis Jones)
(emphasis added).
11. Nathan Koppel, Bankruptcy is Broke: A Compelling New Polemic
Reveals Inherent Corruption in the System of Financial Reorganization, AM.
LAW., May 2005 (emphasis added).
12. Brent Snavely, Local Judge Pushes to Make Firms File on Home Turf,
CRAIN's DETROIT Bus., May 16, 2005, at 43 (quoting statement by Hon. Steven
Rhodes) (emphasis added).
13. MacLean, supra note 9 (quoting statement by Prof. Laura Bartell).
[Vol. 54470
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Indeed, even a sympathetic bankruptcy judge, who
finds LoPucki's principal assertions "pretty accurate,"
further comments:
"It was unfortunate that he 'chose to use incendiary
words like corruption."'' 14
A. The Eye Poking
He used "incendiary words like corruption"? That would
be an eye poke for sure. Surely he did not. Did he? Indeed
he did. A lot. Over and over. LoPucki devotes an entire
chapter of the book to, in his words titling the chapter,
"Corruption."'15 Consider as well the inflammatory tone of
some of the section headings in the "Corruption" chapter:
"Helping Corporate Thieves Keep the Money"'16
"Helping Failed Managers Keep Their Jobs"'17
"Rubber-Stamping Prepackaged Cases"'8
"The Ideology That Facilitates Corruption"'19
And he has not backed down; if anything, he has made
it absolutely clear that he really means it, that indeed
'corruption' is the right word. '20 Recently he wrote the
following for a widely circulated bankruptcy news and
digest service, and took the added measure of distributing it
in advance to a nationwide bankruptcy listserv; it is a tidy
synopsis of the thesis of his book and worth quoting at some
length to get the full flavor of the rhetoric involved:
I charge that some U.S. bankruptcy judges have been corrupted by
the competition for big cases. Some people are upset about the
corruption, others more about the charge. Some of the latter think
court competition is wrong, but that 'corruption' is too strong a
word for its effect. In my opinion, they fail to grasp the enormity of
what is happening in the courts. Some judges are deciding cases
14. Id. (quoting statement by Hon. Robert D. Martin).
15. LoPucKi, supra note 1, at 137.
16. Id. at 145.
17. Id. at 143.
18. Id. at 157.
19. Id. at 180.
20. Lynn M. LoPucki, "Corruption" Is the Right Word, BCD NEWS &
COMMENT, July 19, 2005, at 7.
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not on their merits, but simply with an eye to attracting more cases.
. . . 'Corrupt' is an accurate description of both the choices and the
judges who made them.
I am not without sympathy for the corrupted judges.... If they
chose to compete, they sacrificed their integrity ....
The judges' predicament does not excuse their failure to protect
the legal rights and financial interests of the thousands of
creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders who are
reliant on them. The judges' abdications destroyed companies, cost
people jobs, dissipated value, shuffled entitlements, degraded the
system, and, inevitably, will erode public faith in the bankruptcy
courts.
Of the thousands of people at financial risk in a big bankruptcy
case, only a handful participate actively. The vast majority rely on
the integrity of the bankruptcy process. The bankruptcy judge is
supposed to be the neutral guardian of that integrity. As a result
of court competition, many no longer fulfill that responsibility.
That, to my mind, is corruption. 21
The book sounds the same themes. The essential
message LoPucki puts forth is simple: bankruptcy judges
want big reorganization cases to be filed in their courts.
Because of the ability of "case placers" 22 to forum shop, a
bankruptcy judge has to "compete" for big cases by entering
all sorts of orders desirable to the case placers, without
regard to whether such orders are meritorious. 23 Many
bankruptcy judges give in to this temptation and cater to
the wishes of the case placers, LoPucki argues. 24 Proof of
this lies in the uniformity of decisions by "competing" courts
that are favorable to case placers on controversial topics,
such as critical vendor orders.25 Further proof can be found
in the high failure rate of cases filed in the prominent
forum shopping destinations, Delaware and New York. 26
LoPucki emphasizes in the introduction that the actions of
these bankruptcy judges must be characterized as
"corruption": "To corrupt the bankruptcy system, it was not
necessary to corrupt all the bankruptcy judges. Once a few
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. LoPucKI, supra note 1, at 17, 133.
23. See generally id.
24. See id. at 18.
25. See id.
26. See id.
472 [Vol. 54
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judges succumbed, the cases flowed to them, rendering the
remaining judges irrelevant."27
This "corruption," as LoPucki calls it, is distinguishable
"from mere forum shopping":
[C]ourt competition is an active, deliberate response by the court
to forum shopping. When courts compete, they change what they
are doing to make themselves more attractive to forum shoppers..
• . The court that offers forum shoppers the most may be the only
one that gets cases in the end, but all of the judges who compete
are corrupted along the way. Their actions are 'corrupt' in that they
are dictated not by an attempt to apply the law to the facts of the
case but by the need to remain competitive. 28
Furthermore, if a judge does not "play ball," as it were,
then their court loses the big cases thereafter. Such judges
are called "toxic judges," according to LoPucki.29 For
example, he describes how the Boston judges do not
predictably cater to the case placers, "turn[ing] Boston big-
case bankruptcy practice into a desert," as a result. 30
To give another example, the district court and the
Seventh Circuit in the Kmart3l gravely harmed the ability
of Chicago-a court LoPucki claims had made big strides by
aping the pro-case placer rulings of Delaware and New
York-to attract big cases by overturning the generous
critical vendor payments authorized by Bankruptcy Judge
Susan Sonderby.32 Perhaps so; it is too soon to know for
sure. The overarching theme, though, is the competition
and the concomitant "corruption":
Maybe next time they [the Chicago judges] will give in. Maybe not.
... But if the Chicago judges do not give in, other judges in other
cities will. The cases will go there, Chicago bankruptcy practice
will wither, and the corruption of the bankruptcy courts will
continue unabated.33
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id.
31. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
32. See LOPUCKI, supra note 1, at 165-66.
33. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
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Of particular interest here is the way LoPucki
characterizes Judge Sonderby's actions after the district
court reversed her and appeal was taken to the Seventh
Circuit: "Determined to remain in the competition for cases,
Judge Sonderby refused to order the recipients of the
critical vendor payments to return the money pending the
outcome of the appeal."34 The second clause is factual; the
first is not-but LoPucki frames it as if it were. As to the
italicized first clause-how could LoPucki know why Judge
Sonderby did what she did? Maybe he is right, maybe he is
wrong. I do not know. But I would posit that neither does
he. If he has proof of illicit motivation, beyond his own
inferences, he should state that proof. Lacking same, fair
reporting would, at the very least, dictate that LoPucki in
some way signal that the statement is not provably factual,
but simply his own opinion or prediction. Thus, for example,
he might simply add a qualifying or hedging word, such as
"possibly" or the like. Or, he might omit the first clause,
simply stating the factual second clause, and then add a
follow-up sentence such as, 'Why would she do that?"
Framing it as such is hardly putting Judge Sonderby up for
sainthood, but it is not nearly as blatant an "eye poke" as
the way he said it.
It is this sort of unequivocal and pious condemnation of
judges' and others' motivations-which he states as
unquestioned facts-that has so angered many. For those
with an interest in politics, an apt comparison of his
manner and tenor might be made to filmmaker Michael
Moore's scathing attack on the Bush Administration in the
movie Fahrenheit 9/11.3 5 LoPucki's book is replete with
examples of this approach. Indeed, Courting Failure begins
with a discussion of the Enron case. After noting that court
competition put Enron's board chairman, Kenneth Lay, "in
the catbird seat,"36 LoPucki then offers that "[i]f he [Lay]
chose wisely, the grateful court would protect him from
cresting public outrage and, by so doing, make itself
attractive to the corrupt or incompetent executives of future
bankrupt firms.' 37 On the next page, after calling Lay
34. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
35. FAHRENHEIT 9/11 (Lions Gate Films 2004).
36. LoPUCKI, supra note 1, at 10.
37. Id.
474 [Vol. 54
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"Kenny-Boy" (a Moore-like dig at President Bush himself),
LoPucki states that Lay "needed protection" and that "[h]e
would find it in a bankruptcy court. ' 38 In case that message
was somehow too subtle, the author melodramatically
declares that "all that would stand between Ken Lay and
justice would be a judge of the bankruptcy court Lay had
chosen."39 Lay's biggest concern, LoPucki suggests, was to
avoid the appointment of a trustee. 40 LoPucki concludes
that Judge Arthur Gonzalez, the New York bankruptcy
judge who drew the case, "performed splendidly . . . from
Lay's perspective,' 41 since he did not appoint a trustee, and
thus "[t]he New York bankruptcy court had proven itself a
trustworthy protector of managements accused of fraud."42
The payoff for the New York court was that it soon drew
three more "shopped" cases in which management was
accused of fraud and, according to LoPucki, filed in New
York to avoid the appointment of a trustee.43
Here again, is LoPucki's character assassination-it is
difficult to call it anything else--of Judge Gonzalez fair?
The judge did appoint an independent examiner, who
conducted a massive investigation of the frauds
perpetrated. The old management had already been
replaced at the time of bankruptcy, and there is no evidence
that the new management engaged in any wrongdoing. Is it
not plausible that many bankruptcy judges in the same
context would leave undisturbed the ongoing operation of
the ailing company by the new manager (who LoPucki
concedes was "a respected turnaround manager"44) and yet
order a thorough investigation of past misdeeds by an
examiner? Maybe on the merits the better call would have
been to appoint a trustee. But to make the choice to appoint
an examiner instead does not ineluctably mean that Judge
Gonzalez was being a "trustworthy protector of
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id. at 12.
40. See id. at 11.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Id.
2006] 475
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managements accused of fraud."45  More benign
explanations for Judge Gonzalez's motivation exist, but are
not even considered by LoPucki. Instead, he states as fact
that Judge Gonzalez was, in effect, in Ken Lay's pocket,
inspired by the lure of fame as the Enron judge and by the
desire to entice other fraudulent managements to steer
their companies to the New York bankruptcy court.46
LoPucki may have overestimated the degree of
protection Judge Gonzalez afforded Ken Lay. In May 2006,
Lay was convicted on six counts of conspiracy and fraud,
and now faces a lengthy prison sentence. The claim that
Lay will never be held accountable for his mismanagement
appears inaccurate. Jeffrey Skilling, Enron's former chief
executive, was convicted on nineteen criminal counts.
Other major corporate fraud perpetrators have been
convicted for their misdeeds, and harshly so-even though
the bankruptcy court "refused" to appoint a trustee
(appointing an examiner instead). For example, Bernard
Ebbers, former WorldCom CEO, was sentenced to twenty-
five years in prison in the summer of 2005.4 7 A fifteen year
sentence was handed down in June 2005 for John J. Rigas,
the former CEO of Adelphia Communications. 48
LoPucki has stated recently that "Courting Failure
contains no accusation of corruption against any particular
judge."49 I find it hard to grasp how this statement can be
squared with the book's excoriation of Judge Gonzalez.
Judge Sonderby also might find LoPucki's disavowal a bit
unpersuasive. And the Delaware judges, especially Judge
Helen Balick, are unquestionably skewered by LoPucki.
LoPucki's unabashed and bitingly sarcastic
condemnations of the bankruptcy judges' actions sometimes
come quite close to, and perhaps cross, the defamation line.
Indeed, under tort law, LoPucki's charges of corruption by
judicial officers would be per se defamatory, subject only to
the possible defenses of truth and of the need to show
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Jennifer Bayot, Ebbers Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for $11 Billion
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005.
48. See id.
49. LoPucki, supra note 20.
476 [Vol. 54
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actual malice in cases involving public figures. The core of
defamation law is harm to one's reputation or good name.50
According to the Restatement, "[a] communication is
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. '51
A core form of defamatory communication is one which
adversely affects one's reputation in his business, trade,
profession, or office. Thus, it is actionable per se to ascribe
to another "conduct, characteristics or a condition that
would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of
his lawful business, trade or profession, or of his public or
private office . * "52 This principle applies to judicial
officers.5 3 Stating that a judge is "corrupt" would suffice. A
particular bankruptcy judge could qualify as a plaintiff if
"the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the
conclusion that there is a particular reference to [that
judge]." 54 For some judges profiled in the book, there is
little doubt they would qualify. Of course, given New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, a judge would have to show that
LoPucki either knew his charges were false or acted with a
reckless disregard for truth or falsity.55 Whatever the
ultimate outcome of a defamation action would be, one is
left to ponder-why did LoPucki use such extreme and
derogatory statements? More on that question in the next
section.
What is also intriguing is how LoPucki's rhetoric
changed. With the change in rhetoric came the change in
reaction. He had been writing about venue choice and
forum shopping for fourteen years before publishing
Courting Failure. He wrote numerous law review articles on
the subject. In those articles he made many of the
substantive points that he makes in the book. For example,
in the very first of those articles, in the 1991 Wisconsin Law
Review, writing with his colleague Bill Whitford, LoPucki
discussed the fundamental problem he has identified-that
50. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 400, at 1117 (West 2001).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
52. Id. § 573.
53. Id. § 573 cmt. b.
54. Id. § 564A.
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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bankruptcy judges may decide outcomes in ways that will
attract big cases, but he did so in such a subtle and non-
inflammatory way that no one particularly took offense (or
noticed?). For example: "To the extent that bankruptcy
judges seek to attract major reorganization cases, they
would tend to exercise their discretion in favor of the
positions of the managements of debtors because those
managements have primary control over the initial
placement of cases." 56 The point is essentially the same, but
he does not say that the judges are corrupt for being
susceptible, and even bowing, to pressure.
By 1999, LoPucki had become even more critical of the
shopping phenomenon, and, in an article in the Cornell Law
Review with Theodore Eisenberg, identified the likely
motivating cause to be "shopping for judges. '57 Still,
LoPucki stopped far short of a direct inflammatory
indictment of the judges themselves. The primary word
used by the authors to describe the impact of such judge
shopping was only that it was "embarrassing."58 Indeed,
they specifically disavow any implication "that bankruptcy
judges are less likely to 'follow the law' than other judges." 59
Even when LoPucki, writing with Sara Kalin in 2001,
announced dramatic empirical findings that the
Delaware/New York shopping spree had proved to be an
inefficient "race to the bottom," with much higher refiling
rates for large companies reorganized in those courts, 60
LoPucki did not level charges of personal corruption. In this
article, he did introduce formally the idea of a "wasteful
competition" between courts and stated that courts were
"applying lax standards for confirmation," 61 had made
56. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
1991 WIs. L. REV. 11, 38.
57. Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999).
58. See, e.g., id. at 971.
59. Id. at 972.
60. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the
Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001).
61. Id. at 237.
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"mistakes," may have been "opportunistic" as well as
"inefficient," and were able to obtain something of a
monopoly in the process. 62 But "corrupt"? No. The emphasis
is instead on the failings of the market-a much more
impersonal criticism. Indeed, even when the authors are
most critical, they speak of what the great impersonal
"Delaware" did or did not do,63 rather than speaking to the
failings of specific human beings, as LoPucki does in
Courting Failure.
Nor did LoPucki make the move to personal invective in
2002, when he wrote a piece with Joseph Doherty
responding to critics of his 2001 study with Kalin.64 In this
work he admitted that the "data alone are not yet sufficient
to tell us what caused Delaware's higher failure rates. '65
Indeed, LoPucki couched his further musings as nothing
more than "speculation," and even as to that "speculation,"
the worst he could muster was that "Delaware's bankruptcy
court operates on an unabashedly laissez-faire philosophy.
If the parties are in agreement on a plan, the court will
confirm it. '66 The villain, then, is simply "Delaware's less-
effective reorganization procedures."67 Plainly, the tenor of
these remarks falls far short of the "judges compete and
therefore are corrupt" mantra trumpeted so emphatically in
his book.
II. DID "THEY REALLY NEED IT"?
For whatever reason, Professor LoPucki has chosen to
abandon the course of temperate critique and has embraced
instead the sensational course of charging bankruptcy
judges with "corruption." This is not my interpretation; he
himself proclaims clearly, as noted earlier, that "'corruption'
is the right word. '68 The new rhetoric marks a dramatic and
radical shift from a dozen years of more measured writing
62. Id. at 272.
63. See, e.g., id at 270.
64. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New
York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002).
65. Id. at 1984.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1985.
68. See LoPucki, supra note 20.
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on the subject of venue choice and forum shopping. Three
logical interrelated questions present themselves. First,
why did he take this new approach? Second, related to the
first, is he right? And third, is his strategy effective?
The first question is why LoPucki has moved to the
"muckraker" path. Recall that my wise colleague's maxim is
not to poke someone in the eye, "unless they really need it."
This is the "need" assessment.
In trying to identify LoPucki's motivations, I will try to
heed my own cautions about being careful not to overstate
when pinpointing as "fact" the answer to such subjective
questions. With that caveat, consider several possibilities.
As to each, we should take as a starting premise that
LoPucki believes adamantly that he is right. On this point I
am quite confident that I am right. LoPucki has written a
lot, on a lot of subjects, and throughout his tone bespeaks a
clear sense of personal confidence in the accuracy of his
conclusions. Having said that-so do most academics!
But that is just the starting point. Lots of people believe
they are right and do not call judges "corrupt." What is
driving him? One possibility is simple frustration. He has
been inveighing against forum shopping for years and years
with careful, scholarly analyses, and it has not done a bit of
good. No one has listened, at least not in any way that
makes a difference. When the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission recommended venue reform in its 1997 Report,
he may have been momentarily encouraged, but then soon
it became apparent that nothing would come of that in
Congress, with Senator Biden effectively killing off venue
reform as early as 1998.69 Even when LoPucki and Kalin
published what they believed to be a convincing expos6 of
the Delaware "myth" in 2001, with what they took to be
strong and credible empirical evidence, 70 they did not
change the posture of venue reform in Congress. Indeed,
many attorneys and academics attempted to refute their
findings. 7 1 At some point it just feels good to blow off steam
when you believe you are right, but no one listens; at least
you can enjoy the catharsis of a good tantrum.
69. See sources cited supra notes 5, 6.
70. See generally LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 61.
71. See sources cited supra notes 2, 3.
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But I think it is more than that. The whole tenor of the
book, and of LoPucki's continued very public lobbying and
debating after the book's publication, strikes me as much
more calculating than a mere temper tantrum. I think he
does care passionately about the operation of the
bankruptcy system, and it became clear to him that
something drastic had to be done to get people's attention.
Dry legal discussion about "forum shopping" is just not that
sexy. But calling federal judges corrupt-now that is catchy.
That will be noticed, as the fallout from his book plainly
indicates. In short, sensationalizing a story often is a very
effective means of putting an issue in the spotlight and
possibly effecting change.
Examples of sensational expos6s having a significant
impact are legion. Perhaps the most famous in our country's
history is Harriett Beecher Stowe's publication of Uncle
Tom's Cabin72 in 1852 in reaction to the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850. 7 3 That book, the best-selling book of the nineteenth
century other than the Bible, played a major role in
fomenting public sentiment in ways that led to the abolition
of slavery in the United States. More modestly, Upton
Sinclair's publication of The Jungle74 in 1906 helped trigger
reforms in the meat-packing industry. In current times,
movies often play this role. As noted earlier, Michael Moore
has assailed the Iraq War and the Bush Administration in
classic muckraking fashion in Fahrenheit 9/11,75 and
Morgan Spurlock took aim at McDonald's and fast food in
2005's Super Size Me.76 McDonald's has reformed some of
their practices in the wake of that movie.
Who is LoPucki's target audience? First, of course, is
Congress. Admittedly, successfully effecting venue reform is
a long shot, given the enactment of a major bankruptcy
reform bill in April 2005 that omitted any venue reform
provisions. But you never know. LoPucki made many of the
same criticisms he makes in his book in testimony before
Congress. Apparently, at least Senator Cornyn was
72. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (Harper & Rowe 1970).
73. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, § 7.
74. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (New York, Doubleday, Page & Co. 1906).
75. FAHRENHEIT 9/11, supra note 35.
76. SUPER SIZE ME (Hart Shop Video 2004).
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impressed, introducing the Fairness in Bankruptcy
Litigation Act in February 2005. 7 7 Perhaps if LoPucki can
keep the waters stirred up enough, that bill may eventually
take flight. Who knows?
Even if Congress does not act, what about the nation's
bankruptcy judges and attorneys as a target audience?
LoPucki's strategy of shining the spotlight of exposure on
those judges that he believes have sold out may have the
effect of "shaming" those supposed offenders-and of
deterring other bankruptcy judges from going down the
same path, for fear of future public embarrassment and
humiliation at LoPucki's hands. Forgive the analogy, but
the principle is much like that of publishing the names of
"johns" in the paper as a means of battling prostitution. For
now, it is too early to tell if LoPucki's highly publicized
attack will have any effect on the behavior of the nation's
bankruptcy judges.
An expos6 is only valuable, though, if there is
something to be exposed. Slavery was evil; the conditions in
Chicago meat-packing plants were vile; McDonald's super
size meals are ... well, I better pass on that one. Whether
Michael Moore is right or not about the Bush
Administration is, to put it mildly, a debated point. What
about LoPucki's expos6? Is "corruption" an accurate
assessment? Are the nation's bankruptcy judges selling out
to the "case placers" in order to compete for the glory of
handling big cases? And, in doing so, are they "destroying
companies" and "costing people jobs," as LoPucki charges? 78
If LoPucki is right, then he effectively has announced to
the world that the emperor has no clothes. Everyone knows
it, but no one is willing to state it publicly. In essence,
everyone has been willing to play along with the tacit
conspiracy of silence. Not LoPucki. To use another
metaphor, he has been bold enough to call attention to the
fact that an elephant is in the room. Many people familiar
with the world of high-stakes bankruptcy reorganization
practice believe that his accusations have a strong ring of
truth, while others, as detailed earlier, vehemently and
angrily deny that he is correct. So-is the emperor in fact
77. S. 314, 109th Cong. (2005).
78. LoPucKi, supra note 1, at 118, 257.
482 [Vol. 54
COURTING CONTROVERSY
unclothed, or is the emperor fully clad? Is there an elephant
lurking?
What is LoPucki's proof of his thesis? It turns on a few
basic points. First is the historical fact that in the 1990s a
substantial number of large reorganization cases were
shopped into Delaware. 79 Next is the fact that a number of
other bankruptcy courts subsequently adopted "Delaware
rules" of operating procedures, as well as substantive orders
that would afford the parties virtually the same benefits in
their home court as they could get in Delaware.8 0 Third,
and related thereto, he points to the convergence of rulings
on a number of critical issues in ways uniformly favorable
to the "case placers."' This discussion occupies the bulk of
his "Corruption" chapter.8 2 LoPucki posits that it is
incredible to believe that such a convergence has occurred
by chance. Once other courts started competing, the
Delaware monopoly started breaking up. Next, he points to
the high failure rate of cases filed in Delaware and New
York as evidence that the courts there are being more lax,
and willing to do what the case placers want.8 3 Finally, he
has interviewed many players involved in the process and
has been told repeatedly that the dynamics of the "game"
are as he reports.
So, how persuasive is LoPucki's proof of court
competition? And, to what extent should this be
characterized as "corruption"? I believe that his assessment
of the first round of the "Delaware shop" in the early 1990s,
when Helen Balick was the only Delaware bankruptcyjudge, is pretty accurate. The big advantages for "shoppers"
were that (1) they knew what they were going to get,
because they knew they were going to draw Judge Balick,
and (2) they liked what they were going to get, because
many of her rulings were so favorable to them. The
compelling attraction of Delaware can hardly be disputed
when one sees that, by 1996, Delaware had a virtual
monopoly on big cases. The withdrawal of the reference in
79. Id. at 16, 50, 49-76.
80. Id. at 17, 123-35, 255.
81. Id. at 139-40.
82. Id. at 137-81.
83. Id. at 97-122.
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Delaware in 1997 is stark evidence of a systemic
embarrassment.
After 1996, though, the evidence gets a bit murkier. I
believe that there was indeed some "competition" going on,
as LoPucki asserts, but would suggest that it was not as
uniform or as one-dimensional as he suggests. Certainly a
number of local bars were trying to get "Delaware rules" in
place, and had some success. And certainly over the next
few years, a number of other courts entered orders that
favored case placers. First, though, the motivation for many
of these changes was not necessarily to shamelessly mimic
Delaware just to get cases, but also because there was a
widespread belief that Delaware had come up with, in
effect, "a better way of building a mousetrap." The view was
widely held in the bankruptcy community that the
Delaware approach was more efficient. So, to the extent
there was a "race," it was thought by many to be a race to
the top, not in the other direction. That is why his 2001
study with Kalin was so shocking to so many.
Second, there was not the degree of convergence he
asserts. This was true as between districts and within
districts. Not all judges entered orders favorable to the case
placers. To use the example of critical vendor orders, some
courts held that blanket payment of non-priority unsecured
prepetition claims was not authorized under the
Bankruptcy Code.8 4 Courts that did authorize such
payments differed in the degree of proof required, the
standards for approval, and the scope and extent of
payment authorized. Also, different judges within the same
judicial district took different views on the same issues.
Case placers faced the problem of non-monolithic courts
with multiple judges and a random draw.
Furthermore, the motivation for many of the judges,
even when they entered orders that LoPucki would describe
as favorable to the case placers, was not necessarily just to
compete. I believe that many, if not most, of these judges
honestly believed that they were making a wise decision,
necessary to the prudent administration of reorganization
cases. Bankruptcy judges often believe that they know best,
84. See, e.g., In re Equalnet Commc'n. Corp., 258 B.R. 368 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2000).
484 [Vol. 54
COURTING CONTROVERSY
and utilize their equitable powers under § 10585 to enter
orders to facilitate reorganization, even if those orders are
perhaps not squarely in line with the letter of the Code.8 6
Again, to use critical vendor orders as an example, many
judges believe that making such payments is just a
practical business necessity to further the chances of an
effective reorganization. I do not doubt that LoPucki is
correct in identifying the force of competition as an
exacerbating influence, but that is all.
In other ways I think motivations are more complex
than the picture LoPucki paints. For cases that were filed
in Delaware and in New York, I think the facts of perceived
court expertise, experience with large cases, and
sophistication are very relevant. Also, as Delaware became
the forum of choice, an odd sort of attorney convenience
developed as firms opened Delaware offices, which then
could service the big cases filed there. But again, I do think
that LoPucki is partially correct as well, in that the
expectation of favorable decisions was a contributing factor.
Once large cases started being scattered around the
country, the causal chain becomes much harder to track.
The data set is just not large enough to make convincing
proofs. Some cases were filed in home courts that were not
"safe," and others were shopped out of districts that had
tried hard to be just like Delaware. The bottom line is that
many factors contribute to any particular debtor's choice of
where to file.
The evidence from LoPucki's failure data in some ways
runs counter to his overall argument. He attempts to show
that Delaware and New York cases fail at a much higher
rate than cases filed elsewhere. But he also posits that
other courts had tried to mimic Delaware. Why would those
courts do better in making feasibility predictions if they
were trying to be just like Delaware?
At the end of the day, my assessment is this: Professor
LoPucki is correct that there are competitive forces at work
85. 11 U.S.C. §105(a) (2000) ("The bankruptcy court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this title.").
86. See Charles J. Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75 (1991) (discussing this phenomenon as
it pertains to orders entered in the early days of a reorganization case).
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in the bankruptcy system, given the possibility of forum
shopping. The competitive force, though, is but one of the
many at work in the very complex dynamic of the Chapter
11 system. Furthermore, motivations of individual
bankruptcy judges are mixed. The nation's bankruptcy
judges and bankruptcy practice are both far from
monolithic. Perhaps in some sense there is a tinge of
"corruption," as LoPucki defines it, but I do not think it is
nearly as universal or powerful as he describes. I think just
as often bankruptcy judges decide the way they do because
they believe that they are "in the know" about what is
really needed in the real world of large Chapter 11 practice,
and decide accordingly. That may be hubris, but I am not
sure it is corruption.
III. Is LoPucI's STRATEGY EFFECTIVE?
A fascinating question to ask, given the sensational
rhetoric adopted by LoPucki, is whether his approach has
been effective. Of course, to answer that question, one
would have to know with some clarity what exactly he was
hoping to accomplish. In the prior section I speculated to
some extent on that issue. Preliminarily, it must be said
that the ultimate answer to the query posed in this section
cannot yet be known; with the book recently published, it is
still premature to assess fully his impact. Only time will
tell.
The first and most immediate effect of his book, and one
as to which I would gauge him to be a resounding success,
is that he has people talking. He has them stirred up. He
got their attention. Venue choice, forum shopping, and
court competition are all being discussed and debated.
Conferences are being held, debates staged. Much of the
discussion has been couched as an attack against LoPucki,
but if he has a thick enough skin and can take it, at least he
has pushed the issue into the spotlight.
Related to the first point, LoPucki's book is surely
pushing others to pursue research and scholarship to find
out exactly what is going on in Delaware and other
bankruptcy courts. Even if their main goal is simply to
prove LoPucki wrong, they may reveal or unearth new
information. More knowledge about the facts can only be a
good thing.
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Another effect is that he has persuaded Senator Cornyn
to introduce the Fairness in Bankruptcy Litigation Act in
February 2005,87 which would effect the venue reforms
LoPucki urges. Whether that bill will go anywhere is
another question. There seems little doubt, though, that
LoPucki's previous, more tempered approach had no impact
on congressional action. Senator Biden carried the day on
behalf of his state. By bringing court competition into the
glare of public debate, LoPucki has kept the issue alive.
Sometimes the race goes to the swift, but other times it is
those who persist who win. If he is successful in exposing a
systemic embarrassment, it may become more politically
feasible to counter Biden and enact venue reform. If I were
to make a prediction, I would be less sanguine, but you
never know.
Even if no congressional venue amendments follow
from LoPucki's attempted expos6, he may have an impact in
affecting the practices and rulings issuing from the
bankruptcy judges themselves. Bankruptcy judges may
think twice before issuing a ruling that might be seen as
favoring case placers, both from a fear of exposure as one
who caters to the powerful interest groups and from a
personal reassessment of their own motivations. We may
well see published court rulings that run directly counter to
the interests of case placers as a way for bankruptcy judges
to signal that in fact they are not succumbing to
competition.
Conversely, his book may have the effect of pushing
those who are actively engaged in the sort of competition he
lambasts to go "underground," as it were, and close ranks.
We may see fewer published opinions that grant favors to
case placers. There may be a net loss of transparency in the
operation of the big reorganization cases.
At the end of the day, the one thing we know for sure is
that LoPucki has stirred the pot. Where and how things
will settle down is hard to predict. It surely will be
intriguing to watch.
87. S. 314, 109th Cong. (2005).
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IV. WHY WOULD JUDGES COMPETE?
Always present is the question: why would federal
bankruptcy judges engage in the sort of unseemly
competition and catering that LoPucki charges them with?
They are, after all, getting the same salary for more work,
seemingly not a great deal. LoPucki cites several reasons
why judges might compete. 88
First are the personal reasons. 89 Presiding over a large
reorganization gives a judge great power, status, and
celebrity. That is, LoPucki believes they are motivated in
part by the desire, if I may borrow from Marlon Brando's
famous line in On the Waterfront, "to be somebody."90
Furthermore, the big cases are just a lot more fun,
interesting, and exciting. If you were a bankruptcy judge,
would you rather decide the fate of a large corporation
worth hundreds of millions of dollars and the jobs of tens of
thousands of employees, or preside over routine discharge
hearings and an endless run of lift stay motions?
There seems little doubt that LoPucki has accurately
captured the attitude of some bankruptcy judges. Not alljudges, to be sure, and he frankly admits as much. But with
the possibility of forum shopping, he argues, it does not
matter: if only a few judges will cater to the case placers,
then those judges will get the big cases.91
Second is the incestuous nature of bankruptcy practice
and the bankruptcy "ring."92 The world of significant
players in the bankruptcy world is small, and everybody
knows everyone else. Often, those who ascend to
bankruptcy judgeships are promoted from that inner ring,
and they are both sympathetic to and owe a debt to their
old friends. The local bankruptcy bar desperately wants the
big cases to stay there. Those cases are hugely profitable for
the lawyers. Judges who run off big cases by not playing the
88. LoPuCKi, supra note 1, at 19-24.
89. See id.
90. Brando's character, Terry Malloy, tells his brother, played by Rod
Steiger, "You don't understand. I could have had class. I could have been a
contender. I could have been somebody, instead of a bum, which is what I am."
ON THE WATERFRONT (Columbia Pictures 1954).
91. LOPUCKI, supra note 1, at 24.
92. See id.
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game incur the wrath of the local bar. They are pressured
intensely to "get in the game."
As to this argument, one problem is that many of the
bankruptcy judges do not in fact hail from the bankruptcy
ring. To name just one, Eugene Wedoff, the Chicago
bankruptcy judge who has been presiding over the United
Airlines bankruptcy, was a bankruptcy outsider when he
ascended to the bankruptcy bench.
A related motivation for bankruptcy judges, LoPucki
says, is the desire to keep their job. 93 Bankruptcy judges are
only appointed for 14-year terms. The concern LoPucki
raises is that non-competing judges who thereby scare off
big cases and incur the ire of the local bar will get panned
in performance reviews and run a serious risk of not being
reappointed. 94 In short, they could lose their job if they
don't compete.
Here, a problem with his argument is that the data do
not support the speculation. A very small percentage of
bankruptcy judges overall are denied reappointment if they
seek it. Nor is LoPucki able to point to persuasive case
studies where "toxic" judges paid the price for their toxicity
with their job. On the flip side, there are plenty of
bankruptcy judges who have not played along and who have
been reappointed.
The other side of the job coin is the opportunity, or
"carrot," side. Bankruptcy judges who compete, and are
thus allowed to play in the fast track of big cases, are
positioned nicely to be recruited into extremely lucrative
positions with major law firms. But here again, there is no
hard evidence of actual judges who issued rulings favorable
to case placers and who then capitalized by taking a job
with a big bankruptcy firm. And while some judges surely
have resigned from the bench and gone into private
practice, nothing suggests any causal linkage between
"favorable" rulings and the subsequent job.
93. See id. at 20-21.
94. See id.
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V. WHAT'S THE HARM?
Professor LoPucki posits that "the judges' abdications
destroyed companies, cost people jobs, dissipated value,
reshuffled entitlements, degraded the system, and,
inevitably, will erode public faith in the bankruptcy
courts. ' 95 He despairs of the "destruction of lives and
dreams," and asserts that "[s]uch destructions did occur as
a result of the bankruptcy court competition. '9 6 Examples
he gives include the loss of pensions by Enron employees,
and the loss of health care coverage by disabled Polaroid
employees. 97
The problem with this line of argument is that proving
a counter-factual is difficult, if not impossible, and linking
up the causal relationship is not so tidy. Who knows, maybe
he is right. Maybe if Judge Gonzalez had appointed a
trustee right away in Enron (the failure of which is what
LoPucki seems to feel is one of the most glaring instances of
judicial nonfeasance in recent bankruptcy annals 98), then
employees would not have lost their entire pensions. But is
that right? Was not the water over the dam by that point?
The company was in financial tatters by the time it filed
bankruptcy in the first place. Would it really have enabled
Enron employees to save their pensions if Judge Gonzalez
had just appointed a trustee?
Or consider his incessant fixation on the evils of the
laxity with which Delaware and New York judges
implement the feasibility requirement, leading, he claims,
to a much higher failure rate than in other jurisdictions. 99
Perhaps if a more stringent review had been made on the
issue of feasibility, fewer of those cases would have been
confirmed. But then the case still would be a failure and the
company still would be "destroyed." That is, the cause of the
failure more likely is the underlying economics of the
company's situation, not the lax feasibility assessment. It
seems unlikely that a company that could have been
successfully reorganized turned into a failure instead
95. LoPucki, supra note 20.
96. LOPUCKI, supra note 1, at 257.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 11.
99. See id. at 103-07.
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simply because of poor judicial superintendence. If I am
wrong, then at least a subset of the case placers are acting
directly contrary to their own economic interests, which is
difficult to explain.
If his general claims about competition itself being the
destroyer of companies and jobs are hard to sustain, his
charges about lost value and reallocation of value ring
truer. If a company is not viable, then confirming a case
and letting the company fail later is wasteful; an immediate
liquidation would preserve more value. So too, most of the
sorts of orders he complains of in his "Corruption" chapter
do directly line the pockets of those with leverage-
management who get lucrative retention bonuses, critical
vendors who get their claims paid in full and attorneys who
get paid exorbitant professional fees. They do this pocket-
lining at the expense of other parties in interest who lack
the same sort of leverage in the case. Furthermore, to the
extent that these parties obtain excessive compensation,
that represents a net loss in value for all. At the extremes,
it could even make a difference in the viability of a
reorganization, even though, as noted, such is hard to
prove.
Furthermore, a real harm of a more intangible nature is
the loss of participatory power in the processing of the
Chapter 11 case. Legal scholars and jurists have long
emphasized the significance and independent value of the
right to participate and be heard in judicial matters directly
affecting a party's interests. To the extent that powerful
parties "capture" the Chapter 11 process, many others are
effectively disenfranchised. Their dignity interest is
impaired.
The end result may be a degradation of the entire
reorganization system, and an erosion of public trust and
confidence in the farness of the operation of the system.
There is a real harm when litigants lose faith in the
integrity of a judicial process.
Few things are entirely one-sided, however, and even if
there are real costs to forum shopping, one must ask
whether there are countervailing benefits that are sufficient
to outweigh the costs. The possible benefits of allowing the
Delaware option has, of course, been heavily debated in the
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literature. 100 Advocates argue that the Delaware judges
have developed a special expertise in handling mega-cases,
and thus can move the cases along more quickly, efficiently,
predictably, and competently. The only problem is that, as
LoPucki has shown, the facts do not seem to bear out that
Delaware reorganizations are significantly faster, cheaper,
or more successful; indeed, if anything, the opposite may be
true. But this is a fruitful area for further research. These
fundamental facts really need to be determined with some
degree of certainty before we can fully evaluate the worth of
LoPucki's claims.
VI. WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN BE DONE?
Assume that LoPucki is, at least to some extent, correct
in stating that competition has corrupted the
reorganization process and that real harm has occurred
without sufficient counterbalancing benefits. The natural
follow-up question is, what, if anything, can be done? In
this section I turn from eye poking to ruminate on solutions
to the forum shopping problem and the court competition,
to the extent it does in fact exist.
A. Limit Venue Choice
The most obvious solution, of course, is to limit venue
choice. Make companies file at the site of their
headquarters or principal place of business. Go back to the
pre-1978 world. In addition, the affiliate "hook" would need
to be eliminated. While some manipulation would still be
possible by moving headquarters to a favored forum, that is
much harder to do and is likely to happen considerably less
often. With the opportunity to shop largely eliminated, the
point of competing falls by the wayside. There would be
little to compete for. The only problem-and it is a big
one-is that Congress seems unwilling to make that move.
B. Congressional Regulation of Questionable Practices
An entirely different sort of solution would be for
Congress to enact rules restricting and regulating specific
disfavored practices. In chapter 6, LoPucki complains of a
100. See supra notes 2-4.
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number of different types of orders favorable to case placers
that he argues have flourished and become dominant due to
competition. 101 Perhaps Congress could simply enact
statutes that limit or ban such orders. The room for the
exercise of bankruptcy judicial discretion is limited; a
statute on point would control, and the judge could not
enter an order that contradicted a statute. If he did, that
order would be subject to reversal on appeal. Thus, for
example, if Congress passed a law that provided that pre-
petition unsecured creditors could not be paid on their pre-
petition claims except pursuant to the terms of a confirmed
plan, and had to be paid the same percentage as other
members of their class, then critical vendor orders would be
plainly illegal. 10 2 And Congress has in fact done just this on
some matters in the 2005 BAPCPA. 10 3 For example, in that
Act, Congress imposed strict limits on executive
compensation agreements. 10 4 Thus, the abuse of approving
wildly lucrative management retention packages is now
much more difficult to do than when LoPucki wrote the
book.
This solution is, at best, only partial. First, not every
abuse is readily amenable to statutory regulation. Second,
it is almost impossible to eradicate all vestiges of judicial
discretion, and probably unwise to do so. It would take an
exceedingly detailed statute to even come close to
accomplishing such a result. The risks are then, first, that
Congress may not be able to foresee all eventualities and
thus may do more harm than good; second, the more
specific a statute is, the easier it becomes for a judge to
skirt it by enacting a slightly different order; and third, it
can be quite difficult to police whether a bankruptcy court
is complying with the letter and spirit of the statute. The
101. LoPucKI, supra note 1, at 137.
102. Yes, I have argued that there is such a statute-the Bankruptcy Code.
See generally Tabb, supra note 62. Occasionally a court, like the district court
and the Seventh Circuit in Kmart, generally agrees with my position. See, e.g.,
In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004). But of course, other courts
believe that the Code does not specifically prohibit such orders. What I am
suggesting in the text is a very specific prohibitory statute that leaves no room
for doubt as to its purpose and effect.
103. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2000).
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whole feasibility and recidivism story makes this point:
courts are already required to pass on the feasibility of a
plan, but LoPucki's work has cast serious doubt on how
well, or how seriously, every court is carrying out that
statutory mandate.
The foregoing suggests the most basic problem with
trying to regulate by statute all the forms of abusive orders
and practices that flow from a corrupted competition, which
is that the "bad guys" can always think up some new
practice that gives them an untoward advantage. Unless
Congress is prescient and omniscient, which is doubtful,
any statutes enacted will only bar extant bad practices.
Once a statute is passed and a clever new abusive scheme is
concocted, then a new statute would have to be passed. And
then, yet another scheme would be created, and so on.
C. Limit and Normalize Professional Fees
A related means of combating the ill effects of
competition is to limit professional fees and to normalize
them across the country. One of the big bargaining chips in
the court competition game is who will give large fees, as
requested and without excessive hassle, to attorneys and
other professionals. Since the attorneys play a major role as
case placers, it is directly linked to their own self-interest to
land in a fee-friendly court. Congress could counter this
incentive by imposing fee caps of some sort, as well as by
imposing greater uniformity in fees allowed across the
country. If attorneys knew that by statute, they could not
do better on fees in Delaware than in the debtor's real home
court, that basis for shopping would fall away.
In addition to moving to national uniformity in fees,
Congress might consider imposing stricter limits on fee
allowances. As I proposed in a previous article:
One means of reducing costs that has been explored in great
detail is cutting down on the allowance of professional fees.
There is no question that large attorneys' fees create problems,
both as a matter of public perception about the integrity of the
bankruptcy system and as a burden on the reorganization case
itself...
I am not confident that adopting more particularized guidelines
for fees will accomplish much good. Depending on how the
guidelines are interpreted, that approach might result in only a
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very modest nibbling away at fees allowed-and at considerable
expense in terms of judicial time and effort ....
Two things might make a difference. One would be for Congress
to retreat from its basic position rejecting the principle of economy
that prevailed under the Act .... The other would be for courts to.
. . shake the "time is money" mentality and look at what is left in
the estate, and what the lawyers did to bring that about .... 105
If lawyers knew that they would ultimately be
answerable (in terms of their fees allowed) for the value of
the estate, and that their recovery would be based on a
percentage of the estate, several positive things might
happen. If the case did not look promising, lawyers would
not be inclined to pour a lot of time into that case in a
probably vain attempt to reorganize. This could lead to
quicker termination of doubtful cases. Furthermore, even
promising cases might be concluded more quickly, with less
delay in negotiations. The lawyers would know that they
would not necessarily be compensated for every hour spent,
and thus would have no reason to churn hours. The moral
hazard inherent in a pay-by-the-hour system would largely
be obviated.
The counterargument is that all that would be
accomplished by restricting attorneys' fees is that qualified
lawyers would shun the bankruptcy arena and move to
more profitable areas of practice. This in turn would
hamper the smooth operation of the complex bankruptcy
system. Admittedly, there is at least some truth in this line
of argument. But, it must be balanced against the
inequities prevalent under the currently prevailing system.
Limiting and regulating professional fees is not
necessarily a congressional pipe dream. It is politically
palatable to pick on lawyers. Maybe the best thing for
bankruptcy reorganization practice would be for it to cease
being so incredibly lucrative for attorneys.
D. Resurrect Mandatory Appointment of a Trustee
Another possible reform that might provide a serious
counter to forum shopping and the competition game is to
require the mandatory appointment of a trustee, returning
105. Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 842-45
(1993).
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to the old Chapter X system. Now, though, there would not
be the old Chapter XI dodge (which did not mandate a
trustee) available. If a mandatory trustee statute were
passed, and a debtor wanted reorganization relief, Chapter
11-with its new mandatory trustee requirement-would
be the only game in town. This mandatory appointment
rule could be limited to debtors over a certain defined size,
measured either by total debt or total assets, or of a certain
status, such as a publicly traded company.
If a trustee were always appointed, and if it were
known in advance that such an appointment was
inevitable, many of the choice benefits provided to insiders
as fruits of the competition described by LoPucki would be
eliminated in one stroke. The independent trustee would
not have any incentive to seek those benefits on behalf of
various parties, and indeed would be charged with a
statutory responsibility to ferret out and block unequal and
unfair treatment. Nor would those parties have any means
of leverage by which to procure those benefits.
I previously have suggested that Congress should at
least consider returning to the mandatory trustee
appointment rule:
Another reform idea that has been floated is to appoint either a
trustee or an examiner in every case .... [In the 1978 reform,]
automatic appointment of a trustee was viewed instead as
imposing serious costs. The primary costs contemplated were (1)
the direct expense of an independent trustee and (2) the indirect
expense stemming from the displacement of existing management
and the need for the new trustee to familiarize himself with the
debtor's business. A further negative consequence of the
mandatory-trustee rule was the fact that debtors would mightily
resist filing under Chapter X, where they would be replaced.
Interestingly, the determination to ditch the Chapter X
approach was not the product of an overwhelming consensus.
Indeed, the result reached in the 1978 Code in section 1104 was
arrived at almost grudgingly, after several modest interim steps..
The 1978 blueprint has not been followed. Under the Code,
trustees are almost never appointed. Although section 1104(a) is
not a dead letter, it is not far from it. Courts announce and apply a
very strong presumption against the appointment of a trustee. The
norm is that the debtor continues in possession. This, I submit, is
a perversion of what virtually everyone involved in the 1970s
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reforms intended. Even the mandatory-examiner provision is
routinely ignored by courts. It may be that the pendulum has
swung too far. The question today is whether to swing it back, and
if so, how far.
[T]here is no doubt that Chapter 11 often is used for somewhat
questionable reasons. How questionable depends in part on one's
political as well as business philosophy, but most observers
concede that many debtors do push Chapter 11 to the limits. It is a
fair suggestion that such strategic usage of Chapter 11 would be
reduced, at least somewhat, if the debtor's management believed
that they would be displaced, or even that they plausibly might be
displaced. I believe that the top management of most companies
that file for Chapter 11 do not believe that they will be replaced by
a trustee. If they did think that would happen, they would perhaps
be more reluctant to use Chapter 11.
Critics of the mandatory trustee approach would retort that that
is exactly the rub. Not only would the illicit Chapter 11 cases be
deterred, but so too would proper candidates for relief. To borrow
an old maxim, it would be like "throwing the baby out with the
bathwater." A mandatory system thus would "over deter" filings.
But, a discretionary system, experience shows, underdeters.
There are other possible reasons why a mandatory trustee might
prove beneficial. One would be to speed up the reorganization
process .... An independent trustee, however, would not have a
vested interest in delaying the plan to cut a better deal for himself.
Perhaps just as importantly, a disinterested trustee probably
could be more objective about the feasibility of the debtor's chances
of successfully reorganizing. The current high failure rate of
Chapter 11 cases suggests strongly that far too many hopeless
debtors give Chapter 11 a whirl. Time and money are lost before
these doomed companies are eventually liquidated and put out of
their misery. An independent trustee would not have the same
predisposition as entrenched management always to try to
reorganize the debtor. Such a person could make an objective
assessment that many of these cases should be liquidated earlier
rather than later. The cost savings derived from earlier
termination of these cases very well could offset the cost outlay
involved in hiring a trustee.
Those who worry that Chapter 11 permits unwarranted
reallocations between different categories of claimants also should
have reason to favor a trustee system. The only goal of a trustee
should be to maximize the value of the estate ....
Aside from the cost concern, critics of a mandatory trustee
proposal are sure to object that too many debtors, including some
who could be saved in the friendly confines of Chapter 11, would
be deterred from filing. To some extent that may not be altogether
bad; the Chapter 11 failure rate suggests that there are far more
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hopeless debtors entering Chapter 11 now than there are
salvageable companies who foolishly bypass an attempt at Chapter
11. In other words, if a choice has to be made between
overdeterring and underdeterring Chapter 11 filings, we should
adjust the law now in favor of overdeterring, because the balance
now runs so heavily the other way.
If the deterrence objection is given credence, however, I have a
possible compromise to suggest which may in itself have some
beneficent aspects. That suggestion is to postpone the trustee
appointment for some defined period of time after the Chapter 11
filing. Thus, current management would have a chance to confirm
a plan, but if they did not do so expeditiously, they would be
replaced. . . . [T]hese ideas would be intended (1) to provide the
debtor with a real incentive to move quickly and (2) to formalize
the system for assessing the feasibility of different options and
allow for a termination of the case at an early stage.
In sum, then, I think the case can at least be made for taking a
hard look at the mandatory trustee/examiner issue again. As I
have suggested, many of the objections to such a system could be
met by phasing in implementation in various ways and by giving
the bankruptcy court a discretionary override power. The benefits,
especially in terms of speeding cases up and bringing them to a
quicker conclusion, could be quite significant.
10 6
E. Threshold Feasibility Rule
Another policing mechanism that might be considered
that could help counter the negative effects of court
competition would be to require a threshold finding of
feasibility. If courts were to take this initial step seriously,
then debtors and influential case placers, again, would not
have a guarantee of receiving the expected benefits that
LoPucki finds flow to them under the current regime. Also,
perhaps the high recidivism rate could be lessened. Of
course, the preceding "if' is a point for serious concern; if
courts have indeed been captured to the degree LoPucki
reports, there is little reason to think that they would do
anything other than routinely find in favor of threshold
feasibility. If so, it might be necessary to modify the
following proposal I made to give more decisionmaking
authority to an independent court or administrative body,
or to permit immediate appeal of a bankruptcy court
106. Id. at 854-61.
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decision to the district court on a de novo basis. My original
idea follows:
Another reform that has been suggested is to require the court
to make a threshold finding that the Chapter 11 case is feasible.
The projected benefit would be that hopeless cases could be
exposed early on and would not be dragged out for extended
periods of time. The dismal overall success rate of Chapter 11
cases suggests that a veritable army of candidates for early
dismissal exist.
The Bankruptcy Code presently permits this form of relief,
except that a hearing on feasibility is permissive rather than
mandatory....
Many bankruptcy judges have a strong inclination to give the
reorganization a try. Again, then, we are back in the realm of the
bankruptcy court exercising its discretion in a way that frustrates
the operation of the Chapter 11 system. One could argue that
forcing the bankruptcy court to make an express feasibility finding
will only add time and expense to the Chapter 11 case, without
changing the results at all; the court still will routinely let cases
proceed.
Yet, maybe we should not be so pessimistic. Judges generally
view section 1112 as an extreme remedy, to be utilized only in
extraordinary cases. If Congress were to enact a separate provision
mandating a feasibility finding and make clear that the court's
duty was to make an honest finding, it is possible that bankruptcy
judges would honor the congressional directive and dismiss more
cases....
The feasibility determination would be more substantial if the
United States Trustee were required to make a formal
recommendation to the court on the issue. ...
The concern about an independent recommendation is, of course,
the time and cost of the investigation that would be necessary. The
staffs of the U.S. Trustee offices probably are not adequate at this
point to take on such a task. An alternative possibility would be to
farm out the job. The court could appoint an investigator
(examiner?) in each Chapter 11 case to study the debtor and make
a formal recommendation on feasibility. This would of course
significantly increase costs. The question would be whether the
costs expended on the examiner would be outweighed by the
savings from the mercy killings of terminal cases. 107
107. Id. at 835-37.
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F. Court System Changes
Finally, the corrosive force of court competition, as
depicted by Professor LoPucki, s0 8 could be ameliorated
substantially by making some changes in the structure of
our court system. In this section I offer a few tentative
ideas. These may offer some benefits, but surely have
correlative costs as well. I hope to prod further discussion
and debate about some of these proposals. In making them
I recognize that some are more unlikely to ever see the light
of day than others. I have invited myself to think "outside
the box," and so while some of these notions may seem a bit
fantastic at first blush, I put them forward as a way of
promoting broad-ranging dialogue about how we can best
improve the bankruptcy court system. I believe that such is
the principal goal of Professor LoPucki, and I am a fellow
traveler on that road.
Idea one: allow (mandate?) immediate and ready
appealability of decisions on venue transfer (especially
those denying such a motion) to Article III courts. The
pressures of court competition that LoPucki describes
primarily affect the bankruptcy judges. Article III judges,
who have life tenure and who hear a broad range of cases,
are much more immune to those pressures. Review should
be de novo. If case placers knew in advance that their venue
choice could be overturned by a truly independent Article
III judge, their initial decision might be affected. A further
benefit of such an appeal is that it might add an
imprimatur of legitimacy to decisions not to transfer venue.
Idea two: move initial venue transfer decisions to some
decision-maker other than the court where the case was
filed. This idea is obviously a close cousin of the first idea,
but moves it up one step in the process, by vesting the
original decision on a venue transfer motion in an
independent body. That body could be part of the executive
branch (an arm of the United States Trustee's Office?), or
even a special court vested with this responsibility. Benefits
of moving the initial decision are that it saves a step, and
thus time and money; eliminates any impetus for deference
by a reviewing court that might occur under idea one; and
offers further prospect for promoting the appearance of
108. See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 1.
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legitimacy and fairness. If venue was approved by the
independent "venue board" or "venue court," it might carry
greater weight in the minds of parties and the public. Also,
case placers would be further disadvantaged in trying to
exercise effective leverage.
Idea three: make bankruptcy judges Article III judges.
This grand old idea, which of course has many other
reasons to recommend it (might I mention jurisdiction as
one?), would have the beneficent effect of insulating
"bankruptcy" judges more from political pressures. Indeed,
as an aside, I would note that a colleague of mine has
argued convincingly that the Constitution probably requires
Article III status for judges exercising general jurisdiction
over bankruptcy cases. 109 Furthermore, if bankruptcy
judgeships were given Article III status, the desirability of
those positions in the legal world at large would go up
dramatically, and the chances of the bankruptcy ring
engineering the elevation of one of their own, who would be
beholden to his old cronies, would drop precipitously. This
is such a good idea on so many fronts that it is unlikely to
ever happen.
Idea four: eliminate the specialized bankruptcy courts.
The problem of court competition stems largely from the
capture of specialized courts, and the ability of litigants to
shop between them. Federal district judges who hear a wide
range of matters and who enjoy Article III status would be
much less susceptible to this sort of capture. Indeed, the
fact that the Delaware District Court withdrew the
reference in 1997 at the peak of the public embarrassment
over the doings in the Delaware bankruptcy court is
evidence of this fact. This idea effectively would withdraw
the reference everywhere.
Idea five: establish a super-specialized "reorganization
court" (or series of regional courts) that would have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear mega-cases. LoPucki also
suggests something similar to this idea. Defining which
debtors would fall within the jurisdiction of this new
specialized court would require some line-drawing, whether
done by asset values, total debts, status as a public
company, and so forth, but any plausible line drawn could
109. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the
Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REV. 643 (2004).
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readily sweep within its ambit the vast majority of cases
where court competition is a significant problem. The
benefits of taking this step are twofold. First, it would
eliminate the choice of forums, and thus cut off competition
at the roots. Second, it would allow those courts to develop
special expertise in handling large cases, which has often
been trumpeted as one of the big advantages of Delaware.
CONCLUSION
I thoroughly enjoyed reading Lynn LoPucki's book
Courting Failure. Of course, he was not picking on me, so it
made my reading a lot more comfortable than for many who
play in the high-stakes arena of Chapter 11 mega-cases,
involving billions of dollars and tens of thousands of
employees. The issues that LoPucki brings to the table are
of significant public interest. Fundamental questions about
the fairness and legitimacy of our court system are at stake.
As discussed in this Article, he has chosen the path of a
"muckraker," repackaging much of his prior scholarly work
on the issues of venue choice and forum shopping in a more
sensational form. He has flatly accused many of the nation's
bankruptcy judges of "corruption," and has repeated the
charge when challenged. I describe his approach as akin to
poking people in the eye. As usually occurs when people get
poked in the eye, many have reacted angrily. I hope that
the end result of his eye poking is to bring about beneficial
changes to the bankruptcy court system. Professor LoPucki
puts on the table fundamental issues about the nature and
legitimacy of our bankruptcy reorganization system. We
cannot ignore these questions. He has done a service in
forcing us to confront them.
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